Plan Text: In the United States criminal justice system jury nullification ought to be used during all criminal trials related to marijuana. I reserve the right to clarify, here’s the solvency advocate. **Green 13[[1]](#footnote--1)**

Although its usage is increasing in the American legal system, **far too few people know about**, and understand one of the biggest weapons we have in our civil-rights arsenal; jury nullification. **Jury nullification** is a practice that dates back to before our nation was formed, and is the act of a jury acquitting someone of a charge, even if the evidence is clear, by finding them “not guilty”. By doing so, people can make sure that an individual doesn’t fall victim to unjust, archaic laws. **As a juror, taking this path is simple: Vote “not guilty” to someone** who is **being charged with a bad law**. A bad law being something **like**, say, **cannabis prohibition**. Or most non-violent convictions made under the drug war. No matter how small the charge, such as possession of a roach – or how large, such as an 1,000 plant grow operation, a jury is completely within their legal right to find that person “not guilty”, regardless of what either attorney or the judge has to say. It’s not easy, but it’s possible. If you’re called in for jury duty, you should accept it if you wish to have the opportunity to nullify someone of an unjust conviction. **If you happen to be placed on a jury for a trial where someone’s being convicted of** a non-violent, victimless crime, such as **cannabis possession**, **cultivation or** even **distribution** if it’s clear the person had no ill intentions, than **you should lobby**, hard, **the rest of the jury in getting them to nullify** the charge. The important thing in this instance is education, as many in our society know absolutely nothing about jury nullification, or that it even exists. This isn’t a surprise, as its usage is widely hated, and shadowed by judges. Attorneys are[ethically prohibited](http://thejointblog.com/reminder-juries-can-nullify-charges-they-find-unjust/Further,%20as%20officers%20of%20the%20court,%20attorneys%20have%20sworn%20an%20oath%20to%20uphold%20the%20law,%20and%20are%20ethically%20prohibited%20from%20directly%20advocating%20for%20jury%20nullification" \t "_blank) from directly advocating for jury nullification: When they do, a judge will almost always and instantly call a mistrial. This, along with a general public that doesn’t tend to care about the specifics of our legal system, has led to jury nullification being widely underused, despite it being a huge weapon against draconian laws. Even though it’s underused, it’s not entirely uncommon, and more Americans than ever are becoming aware of it. Laws are even beginning to change, with states like New Hampshire [passing legislative](http://www.infowars.com/new-hampshire-officially-recognizes-jury-nullification/" \t "_blank) just last year to explicitly allow defense attorneys to inform juries of their right to jury nullification, contrary to standard practice everywhere else in the nation. Just a few months after this law took effect, [a man was nullified of a cannabis cultivation charge,](http://reason.com/blog/2012/09/14/new-hampshire-jury-acquits-pot-growing-r" \t "_blank) which would of been a felony. These type of laws will need to be passed everywhere to assure protections to this much-needed safeguard. For now, we must continue to raise awareness to our ability to use jury nullification to correct what is often a broken criminal justice system.

**Advantage one is radiation accidents.** Hemp absorbs toxins from nuclear meltdowns, which solves extinction and removing prohibition is necessary to solve. **Daw 13[[2]](#footnote-0)**

**The planet is** now **facing a nuclear disaster at least 10 times greater than** the infamous **Chernobyl** reactor meltdown — **a magnitude** often **referred to by scientists as an “Extinction Level Event”** (ELE). The Japanese **Fukushima** Dai-ichi **triple nuclear meltdown has already affected the US**. **Radioactive material has been spilling from the power plants** since March 11, 2011, **exposing every creature on Earth to** plutonium, cesium 137, uranium, and other **toxins that travel through the ocean, jet stream and food and water systems.** **People every day drink, eat, breathe and wash with radioactive particles that cause disease, disaster and that could possibly end human life on earth. To limit this catastrophe, all nations should cultivate radiation-eating** fungi and plants such as cannabis **hemp** **to remediate the radiation and mend the ecosystem**. Medical marijuana and hash oil (such as ‘Rick Simpson’s oil’) reduce cancer risk, and **hemp foods and beverages are an excellent nutrition source to bolster the immune systems of people and livestock. Hemp is a biomass champion at cleaning the environment of many toxins including radiation, as demonstrated in the Chernobyl crisis**. High-melanin-content mushrooms that eat radiation are partners in a great phyto-remediation team to clean the environment. Unused government land could be turned over to farmers who agree to grow hemp through FarmAid contracted by the UN and/or national governments. **Nuclear entombment using** lead, aluminum, **hempcrete** building materials **and hemp plastic** with a free-energy cooling system (magnetic, hydro or solar) **can contain and seal off the contaminated reactors and are**a. Nearby structures should be encased in hemp plastic or hempcrete and sealed to reduce indoor radiation. **Natural hemp garments are comfortable, stylish and people can wear them to block UV rays and otherwise reduce their risk. The great stumbling block to healing the nations is cannabis prohibition, enforced by the US** through the DEA at home and **funding the Drug War abroad.** Fukushima is a man-made disaster. **Cannabis hemp is a natural herb offering a lifeline to the planet**. Will future generations look back to see that America used its Drug War lies to block bio-remediation, or **will the US abandon hemp prohibition to salvage the Earth?** That depends on how many people step up to demand that America implement the hemp solution.

**Advantage two is cartels**. Drug war violence is escalating and causing massive instability in Mexico. Saenz **15[[3]](#footnote-1)**

It comes at a crucial time, as Mexico seems to be sinking into an even more severe political and economic crisis: the peso keeps falling while disappearances and assassinations keep rising. the peso keeps falling[6] while disappearances[7] and assassinations[8] keep rising. Meanwhile civilian social protests are violently repressed by the state, while a daily theater of death is delivered by the various drug cartels terrorizing the nation with uncountable disappearances, beheadings and hanging corpses. Such gruesome spectacles are meant to intimidate the populace into fearful denial, complacency and silence. Official estimates state that over 100,000 people have been killed and approximately 25,000 disappeared since former President Calderon declared war on the drug lords in 2006. Many believe the actual numbers are much higher. The Ayotzinapa case confirmed the suspected link between murderous drug cartels and the governments of ruling political parties as both municipal police and federal army were involved in detaining the student-teachers that fateful 26th of September, resulting in 3 dead and 43 disappeared. The federal government has completely failed to provide explanations for the army's role in the students' disappearance, denying access to the army barracks from where came the last signal of their cellular phones. The resulting outrage expressed on both a national as well as global scale accompanies and supports the determination and leadership of the disappeared students' colleagues and .family members trying to find out what happened to their loved ones. Their collective intelligence manifests in an ability to organize and act swiftly. They have formed various civilian caravans composed of parents, student, teachers, human rights workers and legal advisors to tour the north, south, and center of the country to meet with other families of the disappeared. Their hope is to make more visible their plight and connect with others like them, striking a deep chord with the Mexican public; they mirror the reality of an entire nation at the mercy of murderous cartels complicit with an inept government. The strength and persistence of what has now become a wide-reaching movement far surpasses that of a President and Attorney General who have merely tried to sweep the whole pesky affair under the proverbial rug. Not only has the Mexican federal government failed to provide plausible explanations or competent actions, they have not been able to even express credible empathy.

#### An inability to prosecute on weed undercuts Mexican competition and is essential to destroying the cartels. McKay 14[[4]](#footnote-2)

Legal weed in the United States is undercutting Mexican competition. With either recreational or medical marijuana legal in more than half of U.S. states, drug cartels south of the border are beginning to find that growing, smuggling and distributing pot is a much less lucrative business. What's happening: NPR's John Burnett reported from the ground in the northwestern Mexican state of Sinaloa, where drug-related crime is so intense that its coverage is now restricted. One farmer told him that business was not going so well: "Two or three years ago, a kilogram [2.2 pounds] of marijuana was worth $60 to $90," says Nabor, a 24-year-old pot grower ... "But now they're paying us $30 to $40 a kilo. It's a big difference. If the U.S. continues to legalize pot, they'll run us into the ground." If the price slumps to $20 a kilogram, Nabor speculates that the Mexican weed market will collapse. The culprit, Burnett says, is much better domestic weed proudly made in America: U.S.-grown marijuana - some of it cultivated in high-tech greenhouses - is three or four times more expensive than Mexican marijuana. [High TImes editor Dan Vinkovetsky] says prices for Mexican weed continue to slide because it's so much weaker. He says American cannabis typically has 10% to 20% THC, the ingredient that makes a person high, whereas the THC content of so-called Mexican brick weed is typically 5% to 8%. Burnett's findings dovetail an April Washington Post report, which found that drug cartels were instead trying to push cheap heroin after wholesale cannabis prices in Sinaloa crashed from $100 per kilogram five years ago to less than $25. "It's not worth it anymore," longtime marijuana farmer Rodrigo Silla told the Washington Post. "I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization." Source: Getty Images The background: As Mic's Coleen Jose previously reported, Mexican drug cartels remain incredibly dangerous, killing on average 12,896 people per year from 2007 to 2013, making them far deadlier than terrorist group Islamic State. But there's a very simple explanation for all this violence: The illegal drug trade generates more money on an annual basis than the GDP of many individual countries, and Mexican authorities are relatively weak and corrupt. (The recent massacre of 43 Mexican university students by drug cartels likely happened after police handed them off to the criminals for execution.) Drug prices are very difficult to estimate, since no one is actually keeping track of the market, but marijuana is a major revenue stream for drug cartels. This chart from Information Is Beautiful roughly estimates that a square kilometer of marijuana is worth approximately $47.6 million dollars. Source: David McCandless Crushing the weed market and cutting off one of its main sources of revenue is essential to destroying Latin American drug cartels. Cocaine is worth more money, but Mexican cartels may ultimately earn more from weed since they don't have to first buy cocaine in bulk from Colombian suppliers. Why you should care: Legalization in the U.S. won't be a death blow for cartels, who will shift their efforts to pushing other substances or perhaps other ventures entirely (like human smuggling). Western Mexico's Knights Templar cartel, for example, may make most of its money from illegal mining, logging and extortion. An astonishing 2012 New York Times profile of the El Chapo Guzman organization documented the cartel's amazing, corporate-style complexity, including staff accountants and armies of independent contractors. Drug cartels are complex, dynamic organizations that shift with the times. They're not going away anytime soon. Source: Getty Images But marijuana legalization will severely undercut the value of one of their most profitable products. A 2012 study from the Mexican Competitiveness Institute found that U.S. state legalization would wipe out around 30% of the cartels' marijuana market. Another by the RAND Corporation in 2010 speculated that if American weed pushed out cartel-grown pot, the latter's profits from marijuana could plummet by 85%. If defeating cartels is a priority, than the federal government should ease up marijuana by removing it from the Schedule I category of substances with no known medical purpose (a lie) and allow dispensaries in states where marijuana has been legalized to function normally, instead of taxing them to death. Or Congress could legalize the sale of recreational marijuana, which would deal a far more effective blow to cartels than piecemeal legalization on a state-by-state basis. Considering most Americans now support marijuana legalization, that day might not be far off. But for the nearly 13,000 people a year murdered by the drug trade in Mexico, it's still not soon enough.

Ending criminal charges for marijuana is a game-changer for stopping violence in Mexico—takes a huge chunk out of cartel profits and frees up police resources.Hesson 14**[[5]](#footnote-3)**

1. Mexico is the top marijuana exporter to the U.S. A 2008 study by the RAND Corporation estimated that Mexican marijuana accounted for somewhere between 40 and 67 percent of the drug in the U.S. The cartel grip on the U.S. market may not last for long. Pot can now be grown for recreational use in Colorado and Washington, and for medical use in 20 states. For the first time, American consumers can choose a legal product over the black market counterpart. Beau Kilmer, the co-director of the RAND Drug Policy Research Center, says that a few states legalizing marijuana won’t eliminate the flow of the drug from down south, but a change in policy from the federal government would be a game changer. “Our research also suggests that legalizing commercial marijuana production at the national level could drive out most of the marijuana imported from Mexico,” he wrote in a 2013 op-ed. 2. Marijuana makes up more than $1 billion of cartel income Pot isn’t the main source of income for cartels. They make most of their cash from drugs like cocaine and heroin. But marijuana accounts for 15 to 26 percent of the cartel haul, according to RAND’s 2008 data. That translates to an estimated $1.1 billion to $2 billion of gross income. The drop in sales certainly wouldn’t end the existence of drug traffickers — they bring in an estimated $6 billion to $8 billion annually — but losing a fifth of one’s income would hurt any business. On top of that, Kilmer says that marijuana likely makes up a higher percentage of the cartel take today than it did back in 2008. So taking away pot would sting even more. 3. Authorities could focus on other drugs Marijuana made up 94 percent of the drugs seized by Border Patrol in the 2012 fiscal year, judging by weight. If pot becomes legal in the U.S. and cartels are pushed out of the market, that would allow law-enforcement agencies to dedicate more resources to combat the trafficking of drugs like heroin and cocaine.

#### Most comprehensive studies prove violence will be significantly reduced in the long-run, and short-term lashout will be limited **Kilmer et al 10**[[6]](#footnote-4)

However, there is at least one countervailing factor that might reduce violence in the short run. Given that the signal of market decline will be strong and unambiguous, experienced participants might accept the fact that their earnings and the market as a whole are in decline. This could lead to a reduced effort on their part to fight for control of routes or officials, since those areas of control are now less valuable. Of course, that does presume strategic thinking in a population that appears to have a propensity for expressive and instrumental violence. The natural projection in the long run is more optimistic. Fewer young males will enter the drug trade, and the incentives for violence will decline as the economic returns to leader- ship of a DTO fall. 10 However, the long run is indeterminably measured: probably years, and perhaps many years.

#### Cartels won’t compete in the legal market **Carpenter 11**[[7]](#footnote-5)

Legalizing pot would strike a blow against Mexican traffickers. It would be difficult for them to compete with American producers in the American market, given the difference intransportation distances and other factors. There would be little incentive for consumers to buy their product from unsavory Mexican criminal syndicates when legitimate domestic firms could offer the drug at a competitive price—and advertise how they are honest enterprises. Indeed, for many Americans, they could just grow their own supply—a cost advantage that the cartels could not hope to match.

#### Mexico instability undermines U.S. leadership and risks global arms races. Haddick 10[[8]](#footnote-6)

Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America's role in the rest of the world. An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the United States to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world. Should the southern border become a U.S. president's primary national security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let's hope that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control.

#### Heg decline causes nuclear war. **Metz 13**[[9]](#footnote-7)

So much for the regions of modest concern. The Middle East/North Africa region, by contrast, is a part of the world where American retrenchment or narrowing U.S. military capabilities could have extensive adverse effects. While the region has a number of nations with significant military capability, it does not have a functioning method for preserving order without outside involvement. As U.S. power recedes, it could turn out that American involvement was in fact a deterrent against Iran taking a more adventurous regional posture, for instance. With the United States gone, Tehran could become more aggressive, propelling the Middle East toward division into hostile Shiite and Sunni blocs and encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. With fewer ties between regional armed forces and the United States, there also could be a new round of military coups. States of the region could increase pressure on Israel, possibly leading to pre-emptive military strikes by the Israelis, with a risk of another major war. One of the al-Qaida affiliates might seize control of a state or exercise outright control of at least part of a collapsed state. Or China might see American withdrawal as an opportunity to play a greater role in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States has a number of security objectives in the Middle East and North Africa: protecting world access to the region's petroleum, limiting humanitarian disasters, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, limiting the operating space for al-Qaida and its affiliates, sustaining America's commitment to long-standing partners and assuring Israel's security. Arguments that the U.S. can disengage from the region and recoup savings in defense expenditures assume that petroleum exports would continue even in the event of domination of the region by a hostile power like Iran or a competitor like China, state collapse or even the seizure of power by extremists. Whoever exercises power in the region would need to sell oil. And the United States is moving toward petroleum self-sufficiency or, at least, away from dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But even if the United States could get along with diminished petroleum exports from the Middle East, many other nations couldn't. The economic damage would cascade, inevitably affecting the United States. Clearly disengagement from the Middle East and North Africa would entail significant risks for the United States. It would be a roll of the strategic dice. South and Central Asia are a bit different, since large-scale U.S. involvement there is a relatively recent phenomenon. This means that the regional security architecture there is less dependent on the United States than that of some other regions. South and Central Asia also includes two vibrant, competitive and nuclear-armed powers—India and China—as well as one of the world's most fragile nuclear states, Pakistan. Writers like Robert Kaplan argue that South Asia's importance will continue to grow, its future shaped by the competition between China and India. This makes America's security partnership with India crucial. The key issue is whether India can continue to modernize its military to balance China while addressing its immense domestic problems with infrastructure, education, income inequality and ethnic and religious tensions. If it cannot, the United States might have to decide between ceding domination of the region to China or spending what it takes to sustain an American military presence in the region. Central Asia is different. After a decade of U.S. military operations, the region remains a cauldron of extremism and terrorism. America's future role there is in doubt, as it looks like the United States will not be able to sustain a working security partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the future. At some point one or both of these states could collapse, with extremist movements gaining control. There is little chance of another large-scale U.S. military intervention to forestall state collapse, but Washington might feel compelled to act to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons if Islamabad loses control of them. The key decision for Washington might someday be whether to tolerate extremist-dominated areas or states as long as they do not enable transnational terrorism. Could the United States allow a Taliban state in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, if it did not provide training areas and other support to al-Qaida? Most likely, the U.S. approach would be to launch raids and long-distance attacks on discernible al-Qaida targets and hope that such a method best balanced costs and risks. The Asia-Pacific region will remain the most important one to the United States even in a time of receding American power. The United States retains deep economic interests in and massive trade with Asia, and has been a central player in the region's security system for more than a century. While instability or conflict there is less likely than in the Middle East and North Africa, if it happened it would be much more dangerous because of the economic and military power of the states likely to be involved. U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been described as a hub-and-spokes strategy "with the United States as the hub, bilateral alliances as the spokes and multilateral institutions largely at the margins." In particular, the bilateral "spokes" are U.S. security ties with key allies Australia, Japan and South Korea and, in a way, Taiwan. The United States also has many other beneficial security relationships in the region, including with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. America's major security objectives in the Asia-Pacific in recent years have been to discourage Chinese provocation or destabilization as China rises in political, economic and military power, and to prevent the world's most bizarre and unpredictable nuclear power—North Korea—from unleashing Armageddon through some sort of miscalculation. Because the U.S. plays a more central role in the Asia-Pacific security framework than in any other regional security arrangement, this is the region where disengagement or a recession of American power would have the most far-reaching effect. Without an American counterweight, China might become increasingly aggressive and provocative. This could lead the other leading powers of the region close to China—particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—to abandon their historical antagonism toward one another and move toward some sort of de facto or even formal alliance. If China pushed them too hard, all three have the technological capability to develop and deploy nuclear weapons quickly. The middle powers of the region, particularly those embroiled in disputes with China over the resources of the South China Sea, would have to decide between acceding to Beijing's demands or aligning themselves with the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan bloc. Clearly North Korea will remain the most incendiary element of the Asia-Pacific system even if the United States opts to downgrade its involvement in regional security. The parasitic Kim dynasty cannot survive forever. The question is whether it lashes out in its death throes, potentially with nuclear weapons, or implodes into internal conflict. Either action would require a significant multinational effort, whether to invade then reconstruct and stabilize the nation, or for humanitarian relief and peacekeeping following a civil war. Even if the United States were less involved in the region, it would probably participate in such an effort, but might not lead it. Across all these regions, four types of security threats are plausible and dangerous: protracted internal conflicts that cause humanitarian disasters and provide operating space for extremists (the Syria model); the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; the seizure of a state or part of a state by extremists that then use the territory they control to support transnational terrorism; and the old specter of major war between nations. U.S. political leaders and security experts once believed that maintaining a full range of military capabilities, including the ability to undertake large-scale, protracted land operations, was an important deterrent to potential opponents. But the problem with deterrence is that it's impossible to prove. Did the U.S. military deter the Soviet seizure of Western Europe, or did Moscow never intend to do that irrespective of what the United States did? Unfortunately, the only way to definitively demonstrate the value of deterrence is to allow U.S. power to recede and see if bad things happen. Until recently, the United States was not inclined to take such a risk. But now there is increasing political support for accepting greater risk by moving toward a cheaper military without a full range of capabilities. Many Americans are willing to throw the strategic dice. The recession of American power will influence the evolution of the various regional security systems, of which history suggests there are three types: hegemonic security systems in which a dominant state assures stability; balance of power systems where rivals compete but do not dominate; and cooperative systems in which multiple states inside and sometimes outside a region maintain security and limit or contain conflict. Sub-Saharan Africa is a weak cooperative system organized around the African Union. Even if there is diminished U.S. involvement, the sub-Saharan African security system is likely to remain as it is. Latin America might have once been a hegemonic system, at least in the Caribbean Basin, but today it is moving toward becoming a cooperative system with a diminished U.S. role. The same is true of Europe. The Middle East/North Africa region, South and Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific will probably move toward becoming balance of power systems with less U.S. involvement. Balances of power can prevent major wars with adept diplomacy and when the costs of conflict are high, as in Europe during the Cold War, for instance. But catastrophic conflicts can happen if the balance collapses, as in Europe in the summer of 1914. Power balances work best when one key state is able to shift sides to preserve the balance, but there is no candidate to play this role in the emerging power balances in these three regions. Hence the balances in these regions will be dangerously unstable.

**Next is solvency**, First, The AFF functionally legalizes marijuana because it makes it so that it would be impossible to actually convict someone, so even though our cards say legalization I still solve, because nobody could ever get a conviction and the price and amount of marijuana sold in the US would drop significantly. Second,Jury nullification on a large scale eventually leads to a change in the law I sight a laundry list of warrants, and overwhelming historical precedent. **Parlato 12[[10]](#footnote-8)**

Below is something that somehow is not taught in public schools. It is history nonetheless and easy enough for any one who is interested to verify. Jury ended power of King in 1215, when the Barons of England compelled King John to sign the Magna Carta, trial by jury was established. The King now had to seek permission through 12 citizens unanimous in their verdict before he could take anyone's freedom away. That’s why we have jury trials: To protect people from government oppression. Right of Assembly; Freedom of Religion; jury can’t be punished In 1670, Quakers William Penn and William Mead were prosecuted for preaching to an assembly. The government did not approve of the Quaker religion and made laws against public assembly. At the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury to return a guilty verdict. Four jurors, led by Edward Bushell, refused to return the guilty verdict. The judge then ordered the jury locked up until they returned with an acceptable verdict, the one he had asked them to return. For two days the jury refused to return a guilty verdict and the judge ended the trial. As punishment, the judge ordered the jurors imprisoned until they paid a fine. Bushell refused and spent months in jail. He was eventually released after his habeas corpus petition prompted the Court of Common Pleas chief judge to rule that a jury can nullify the law and forbade judges from punishing jurors for their verdicts. Witch trials stopped **The Salem witch trials began in 1692. After** a splendid year-long government conviction rate and **the execution of 33 witches**, in May, 1693, **juries decided the court** of Oyer and Terminer had gone too far. They **nullified the witchcraft law with 52 consecutive** **hung juries and/or acquittals**. **Frustrated, prosecutors ceased bringing cases to trial**. Juries made it impossible to hang or otherwise put to death known witches in Salem. Freedom of speech won by jury In 1734, John Peter Zenger’s newspaper criticized the Royal Governor of New York. It was against the law to criticize the government in Colonial America, as it still is in many countries that do not have jury trials. The British charged Zenger with seditious libel. At his trial, Zenger’s lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, admitted Zenger broke the law but asked the jury to acquit because the law was bad and Zenger published the truth. Chief Justice James Delaney disagreed. "The truth is no defense," he ruled. Hamilton urged the jury “to make use of their own consciousness and understandings in judging of the lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects,” declaring jurors “have the right, beyond all dispute, to determine both the law and the fact.” Hamilton said if jurors cannot nullify laws, then "juries (are) useless, to say no worse . . . The next step would make the people slaves." The transcripts of the trial were widely published and the verdict encouraged literature critical of England by such as Franklin, Jefferson, Paine and others. If Zenger’s jurors had obeyed the judge’s directions, the people of America might still enjoy British rule.  Jury trial in the bill of rights Given the jury’s role in Zenger’s and many other Colonial trials, the framers of the Constitution envisioned that juries would continue this role when they guaranteed jury trials in the Sixth Amendment. Benjamin Franklin said that jury nullification is “better than law, it ought to be law, and will always be law wherever justice prevails.” Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making [of] them.” Alexander Hamilton said of some of the framers of the constitution, “If they agree on nothing else, (they) concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists of this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.” Capital punishment  **Juries in England and America used nullification to reject** **harsh** applications of **capital punishment forcing both countries to limit the** **death penalty** to murder and treason. Nullified fugitive slave act  **The fugitive slave law** of 1850 was enacted to mollify slave owners from the South who were threatening to secede from the Union since slaves were illegally running away and the North was not doing enough to stop it. The law **provided** for stiff **punishment for “criminals” who helped slaves escape**. In Syracuse, New York, **24** “criminals” **were indicted for helping a slave escape** from jail. A federal judge in Buffalo called the defendants "disturbers of society." **Four trials ended in three acquittals and compelled the government to drop the charges**. **In 1851, a crowd** broke into a Boston courtroom and **grabbed a slave** named Shadrach Minkins **and turned him loose**. The judge called the defendants’ actions in that case "beyond the scope of human reason." President Millard Fillmore demanded prosecution. **A grand jury indicted three people**. Daniel Webster led the prosecution. **After one acquittal and several hung juries, the government was forced to drop all charges**. **Because of juries**, a network of **criminals called abolitionists organized knowing** northern **juries would not convict.** Things got worse. The Southern States did secede. The Civil War followed and then the Emancipation Proclamation. If northern juries had simply followed the law as the judge directed, African Americans might still be human property in accordance with federal law. Set Wild Bill Hickok free Wild **Bill Hickok** and Davis Tutt **engaged in a** one-on-one **pistol**, quick draw **duel on** July 21, **1865** in Springfield, Missouri. Tutt was killed. **Hickok was charged with manslaughter.** **Mutual combat was against the law**. **Witnesses claimed** both men fired, but **Tutt was the initiator**, the first to display overt aggression. It was a question of honor. Had Hickok not fought, he would have been branded a coward. **Judge** Sempronius **Boyd** instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the law. Then he famously **instructed that they could nullify** by applying the unwritten law of the "fair fight" and acquit. The **jury acquitted Hickok**. Helped end prohibition **In 1920, the** US **Constitution was amended to prohibit** the sale of **alcohol** because a majority wished to impose their moral beliefs on the minority of citizens. The jury protected citizens from the tyranny of the majority. During Prohibition, **juries nullified alcohol control laws about 60 percent of the time**. **The fact that most juries would not convict** on alcohol control laws **made the use of alcohol widespread** throughout Prohibition. **Jury resistance contributed to the adoption of the Twenty-first amendment repealing Prohibition**. The jury reflecting made prohibition a toothless amendment.  Union rights In the late 19th century, **vigorous prosecution on "conspiracy" charges against** criminals known as **striking union workers was thwarted by jury acquittals** **and gave unions the right** **to** organize, assemble, and **go on strike**. \* \* \* As you can see, throughout history, government has on occasion not always been right. Some say there is plenty wrong with our present-day government. Only the people have lost sight of their duty to know their proper role: To vote in the jury box as they vote in the ballot box. It is also seen that government has no capacity to admit its laws are wrong. By its very nature, government must try enforce its laws - good or bad. It is for these two reasons that we have juries to protect our freedoms. Now you might think that since the jury brought us so many of our cherished freedoms, the government would want the true role and purpose of the jury taught to every child in every public school.  I wonder why that does not happen?

Also all the instances above were just instances of partial nullification, whereas the AFF ensures that every single marijuana trial is nullified, so my internal link is much stronger then the examples in the card, which makes solvency even more probable. Next, The standard is util, First, Human decision-making is governed by principles of biology and physics, denying the existence of free will and proving determinism. **Coyne 12**[[11]](#footnote-9)

The first is simple: **we are** biological creatures, collections of **molecules** that must obey the laws of physics. All the success of science rests on the regularity of those **laws**, which **determine the behavior of every molecule** in the universe. Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment, an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. **Everything that you** think, say, or **do, must come down to** molecules and **physics**. True "**free will**," then, **would require us to** somehow **step outside** of **our brain**’s structure and modify how it works. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because**[but] "we" are** simply **constructs of our brain. [and] We can't impose a** nebulous **"will" on** the inputs to **our brain** that can affect its output of decisions and actions, **any more than a** programmed **computer can** somehow reach inside itself and **change its program**.

If determinism is true, the only coherent moral framework is utilitarianism, since it does not assign moral responsibility to the free will of individual actors, but instead simply evaluates the goodness or badness of overall states of affairs. **Greene and Cohen 04**[[12]](#footnote-10)

Even if there is no intuitively satisfying solution to the problem of free will, it does not follow that there is no correct view of the matter. Ours is as follows: when it comes to the issue of free will itself, hard determinism is mostly correct. **Free will**, as we ordinarily understand it, **is an illusion**. **However,** it does not follow from the fact that free will is an illusion that there is no legitimate [a] place for responsibility. Recall from x 2 that **there are** two general **justifications** **for holding people** legally **responsible** for their actions. The retributive justification, by which the goal of punishment is to give people what they really deserve, does depend[s] on this dubious notion of free will. However, **the consequentialist approach does not require** a belief in **free will** at all. As consequentialists, **we can hold people responsible** for crimes simply **because doing so has**, on balance, **beneficial effects** through deterrence, containment, etc. **It is** sometimes **said** that **if we do not believe in free will then we cannot legitimately punish anyone** and that society must dissolve into anarchy. In a less hysterical vein, Daniel Wegner argues that **[but] free will**, while illusory, **is a necessary fiction for the maintenance of our social structure** (Wegner 2002, ch. 9). We disagree. There are perfectly good, forward-looking justifications for

Second, Governments has a specific obligation to be utilitarian, **Woller 97**[[13]](#footnote-11)

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently,public**policies in a democracy must be justified to the public**, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such **[but] justification cannot** simply **be assumed** a priori **by** invoking some higher-order **moral principle**. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that **public policies inevitably entail trade-offs** among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and **since public policies** inherently **imply winners and losers, the** **policymakers' duty [is]** to the public interest requires them **to demonstrate** that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by **their polices are** somehow **to the** overall **advantage of society**. At the same time, deontologically based ethicalsystems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, [Also,] a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse

And, Act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states. **Sunstein and Vermuele 5**[[14]](#footnote-12)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

Third, only states of affairs give teleological relevance to ethics **Ariansen 98**[[15]](#footnote-13)

Suspending for a while the idea of morality as a game, one could approach the question of the nature of ethics from another angle. One could try to seek out a set of necessary and sufficient condi- tions for ethics to be operative. **What traits of ethics cannot be lacking without ethics losing its meaning? Will ethics be meaningful in a world where no suffering** (to focus on the duty to alleviate suffering rather that promote happiness) **is known to anyone? Technically it would be possible to tell a lie** or break a promise **in such a society, but the difference between lying and telling the truth** or breaking and keeping promises **would have no moral significance, since any outcome** of any event **is just as good** (rather, as indifferent) **as any other** outcome of the event. In such a world any mention of responsibilities and duties would be meaningless. Ethics clearly needs to relate to joy and suffering. This **axiological orientation is necessary to give meaning to the ethical project**, to mark it out as an ethical project in contrast to other projects of rationalization.

#### Teleology outweighs and is a litmus test for ethical theories – if other ethics are meaningless then we should use consequentialism anyways. Also if there in any moral uncertainty default to minimizing existential risk, Bostrom 12[[16]](#footnote-14)

These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest[s]** **a**n alternative, complementary **way of looking at** existential **risk**; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then **we should recognize that there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value** and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, **[thus] we must prevent any existential catastrophe.**

And, Debating specific nuclear scenarios is key to stave off actual nuclear war.   
**Harvard Nuclear Study Group, 83**[[17]](#footnote-15)

The question is grisly, but nonetheless it must be asked. **Nuclear war**[sic] **cannot be avoided simply by refusing to think about it**. Indeed **the task of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war should begin with an effort to understand how it might start**. When **strategists**in Washington or Moscow study the possible origins of nuclear war, they **discuss “scenarios,”** imagined **sequences of future events that could trigger the use of nuclear weaponry**. Scenarios are, of course, speculative exercises. They often leave out the political developments that might lead to the use of force in order to focus on military dangers. That nuclear war scenarios are even more speculative than most is something for which we can be thankful, for it reflects humanity’s fortunate lack of experience with atomic warfare since 1945. But **imaginary as they are, nuclear scenarios can help identify problems not understood or dangers not yet prevented because they have not been foreseen**.

Next is theory spikes, Evaluate the round using a comparing worlds paradigm, Truth-testing prescribes an absolute, unmeetable burden to the AFF and gives the NEG infinite ground**. Nelson 08[[18]](#footnote-16)**

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the affirmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truth-claims until we are persuaded otherwise, the affirmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the affirmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufficient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges find ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. **If the neg**ative **need only prevent the aff**irmative **from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate** to deny our ability to make truth**-statements** or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies seem** fundamentally **unfair, as they provide the neg**ative **with** functionallyinfinite ground, as there are **a nearly infinite variety of** such **skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the aff**irmative **to a much smaller range of options:** advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

This means that in addition to skeptical or critical arguments, you reject all non-consequentalist standards because they by definition can’t evaluate the end state in a certain world, and AFF gets to pick the evaluative paradigm it’s key to clash, **O’Donnell 4**[[19]](#footnote-17)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

Third, If the full text of the AFF is disclosed an hour before the round, don’t let the negative read a theory interp unless full text of the shell was disclosed on their wiki page at least an hour before the round. A) Solves and deters abuse because I might change my AFF strategy in order to meet your interps, also this spills over to other round because other people you debate against might do the same. This solves abuse, and lets us talk about the topic instead of talking about esoteric theory norms, that are useless outside of debate. B) Checks back against theory prolif. They have bidirectional interps, and a nearly infinite number of ways to agrue that the AFF is unfair, that I could predict. Disclosure solves because it gives me a finite list of arguments you may run, that I can prepare for which checks back against bad interps that only win because they’re surprising. C) Encourages deeper theory debates, if they need to happen. If I wasn’t going to adjust my strategy then giving me an our to prep a counter interp, ensures that we actually have a well prepped argument, which is key to helping us decide as a community whether or not we think something like Nebel T is a good idea. Also an hour is key because I need a while to change the AFF strategy and potentially meet their interps, and this only applies to the negative because I don’t know what they’ll do in the 1NC so I would have to disclose an interp to check back against every conceivable abusive thing they could do, whereas the AFF was disclosed. Fourth, the negative may not use fiat on any actor other then juries, it would kill all AFF ground. **Straight and Wallace 7**[[20]](#footnote-18)

An examination of the question offiating "'the object" makes our position even more clear. Except for those who believe in 'negative flexibility' as a cult-like religion, everyone agrees thatthe negative should not be able to fiat the object of the plan; otherwise their win percentage would skyrocket at the expense of the affirmative. Imagine you are running an affirmative which gives condoms and educational assistance in order to solve an HIV/AIDS advantage. What substantive answer would you have to a counterplan that had all people infected with HIV become celibate? Orsuppose your plan was designed to solve a genocide. The counterplan to have the culpable government cease killing people probably solves your affirmative better than you could ever hope to with the plan. These are intuitively unfair, making it impossible for the affirmative to generate offense. But what 111lewould we udopt to preclude their discussion? Perhaps the negative should not be able to fiat a decision-maker who is affected by the plan. Even if thcre was some non-arbirnuy way 10 decide what and who the plan affects. it is unclear if even that nile would be sufficient. Consider affirmatives which uf<::l:ue that the World Health Oft,4mlization is making somcthing worse. perhaps by offering defective medicine or equipl11cnt, and so the plan has the United States increase public health assistance in order to offset the poor assistance in rhe status quo. The cOlJllterplao to have the WHO change its policy solves the whole case, and the plan does not actually affect the WHO (the object oflhe plan is still some- where in sub-Saharan Africa), so our previously identified mle is insuf- ficient forexduding this cownerplan, yec it is abo intuitively wl,air. When alternative agent fiat is allowed, there really is no non-arbitrary method of preventing object fiat. Since every harm area is a consequence of one's not solving it, every alternative agent counterplan is at least a little bit object fiat. While some counterplans are clearly '"more unfair" than others, if we can agree with the general principle that object fiat harms competitive equity, the only true solution is to prevent all alternative agent fiat.

#### Even modest losses means cartels can’t corrupt the police and judiciary **Usborne 14**[[21]](#footnote-19)

A 2012 research paper by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute in Mexico called ‘If Our Neighbours Legalise’, said that the legalisation of marijuana in Colorado, Washington and California would depress cartel profits by as much as 30 per cent. A 2010 Rand Corp study of what would happen if just California legalised suggests a more modest fall-out. Using consumption in the US as the most useful measure, its authors posit that marijuana accounts for perhaps 25 per cent of the cartels’ revenues. The cartels would survive losing that, but still. “That’s enough to hurt, enough to cause massive unemployment in the illicit drugs sector,” says [fellow at the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center David] Shirk. Less moneyfor cartels means weaker cartels and less capacity to corrupt the judiciary and the police in Mexico with crumpled bills in brown envelopes. Crimes like extortion and kidnappings are also more easily tackled.

#### Alternative activities can’t make up for profits—post-prohibition effect on the mafia proves **Robelo 13**[[22]](#footnote-20)

It is also impossible to foresee how regulation would affect levels of violence. Some analysts believe a short-term increase in violence is possible (as competition over a smaller market could intensify), but that violence in the longer term will decline. n106 Some analysts point out that organized crime may further diversify into other activities, such as extortion and kidnapping, though these have been shown to be considerably less profitable than drug trafficking. As one scholar [\*1249] notes, given the profitability of the drug trade, "it would take roughly 50,000 kidnappings to equal 10% of cocaine revenues from the U.S. n107 While the American mafia certainly diversified into other criminal endeavors after the Repeal of alcohol Prohibition, homicide rates nevertheless declined dramatically. n108 Combining marijuana regulation with medical regulatory models for heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine could strike a major blow to the corrosive economic power of violent trafficking organizations, diminishing their ability to perpetrate murder, hire recruits, purchase weapons, corrupt officials, operate with impunity, and terrorize societies. Moreover, these approaches promise concrete results - potentially significant reductions in DTO revenues - unlike all other strategies that Mexico or the United States have tried to date. n109 Criminal organizations would still rely on other activities for their income, but they would be left weaker and less of a threat to security. Furthermore, the United States and Latin American governments would save resources currently wasted on prohibition enforcement and generate new revenues in taxes - resources which could be applied more effectively towards confronting violence and other crimes that directly threaten public safety. n110

#### Plan creates a reverse gateway effect that reduces demand for harder drugs, which bolsters solvency. **Herrington, 12**[[23]](#footnote-21)

Legalization Will Hurt the Cartels A chorus of Latin American leaders think legalization will undermine the cartels, and they advocate it as a new strategy in the war on drugs. In March, Otto Perez Molina, the president of Guatemala, announced his interest in legalizing drugs in an effort to fight the cartels, including the Zetas, who were allegedly behind a May 2011 attack that left 27 dismembered workers on a farm in northern Guatemala. Molina, however, is not the only leader to suggest that drug legalization could help stem the rising tide of drug-related violence in Latin America. In fact, former Mexican President Vicente Fox also supports the legalization of marijuana, [7] as do César Gaviria, Ernesto Zedillo, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Ricardo Lagos, former presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile respectively. [8] The government of Uruguay is also agitating for legalization. There, officials announced that marijuana legalization and regulation may be used to help fight cocaine use and abuse. The government also says it would sell the drug directly, tracking buyers in the process and limiting the black market’s ability to usurp this new supply. [9] Grillo agrees. He suggests that mass-burnings of marijuana in Mexico, for instance, a hallmark in source control, do more to illustrate exactly how hulking the narco-economic edifice of the cartel’s drug industry really is, than it does to elucidate how Mexico constantly hammers their organizations. It also demonstrates that U.S. demand for product will continue to encourage the flow of marijuana and, by extension, other drugs over the border. Citing a narrowly defeated attempt by California voters to legalize marijuana, and petitioners in Colorado promoting a referendum to do the same, Grillo highlights the fact that campaigns for legalization view the Mexican Drug War “as a reason to change U.S. drug laws.” Moreover, these campaigners argue that “American ganja smokers are giving billions of dollars to psychotic Mexican drug cartels, […] and legalization is the only way to stop the war.” [10] Grillo concedes that the cartels have morphed into diversified, 21st century firms with entrenched profit sources well beyond the scope of the marijuana industry. Nevertheless, he concludes, legalization as a strategy in the war on drugs could still do more in the effort to undermine cartel profits than the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Mexican army ever have. Legalization “might not kill the Mexican cartels,” he says, however it certainly could inflict a deep wound upon their organizations. Armstrong accuses the U.S. of failure in its war on drugs, and asserts that the violence in Mexico is only one consequence. Despite the tightening of post-9/11 border regulations, tons of cocaine and marijuana continue to pass into the U.S. and billions of dollars in illicit money and weapons are passing into Mexico. Traditional policies hardly curb this two-way flow of illicit traffic, in essence, because secondary and tertiary criminal lieutenants are prepared to fill the void when their leaders are arrested or killed. Indeed, General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., the leader of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), testified before the U.S. Senate, stating that the “decapitation strategy” may succeed in killing key drug figures, but “it ‘has not had an appreciable effect’ in thwarting the drug trade.” [11] The Mexican government has even started rethinking its approach. Instead of focusing on the interdiction of drugs bound for U.S. markets, Mexican authorities are starting to focus more on their citizens’ safety. Obama Administration officials, for their part, have chastised Latin American leaders for debating the legalization strategy, whilst also stressing the importance of shared responsibility to the Mexican government. In spite of this, the U.S. has done little on its end to stem the actual demand for illicit drugs. Armstrong believes U.S. policymakers must launch a serious dialogue here [in America] on legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, the drugs. It’s not a perfect solution, but it’s better than no solution at all. […] The United States needs a strategy to win the war or to settle it. [12] Indeed, if shared responsibility means anything, it means that the U.S. must do its part not to enable the continuation of the drug wars. That means that in addition to the possible legalization or decriminalization of marijuana (and other drugs for that matter), the U.S. must slow the flood of weapons and cash, the cartels’ raison d’etre. [13] Most importantly, legalization could undermine Latin American cartels by removing from marijuana, the so-called “gateway effect.” As has happened in other countries, such as Portugal, where decriminalization has been experimented with on a large scale, isolating marijuana from the black market makes it more difficult for drug dealers to push “harder” narcotics on individuals using marijuana. More will be said on this subject below, but for now, suffice it to say that this has the potential to undermine the cartels—perhaps the foundations of the black market itself—across the board, from the ground up. [14]

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